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REVISITING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE HAZARDOUS
WORK AMIDST THE ANTHRAX CRISIS OF 2001
John B. Floodt
I. INTRODUCTION
He made the 911 call at 4:39 a.m. on Sunday, October 21, 2001.' The
caller, Thomas Morris Jr., a postal employee who worked at the Brentwood
Mail Processing and Distribution Center (Brentwood) in Washington D.C.,
was dying from inhalational anthrax to which he was exposed while at
work. He believed he had been exposed one week earlier, when a co-
worker in his vicinity reportedly found an envelope with a powdery
substance in it.2 A portion of the 911 phone call went as follows:
OPERATOR: "Hello."
MORRIS: "Yes, um, my name is Thomas L. Morris Jr. I'm at
4244 Suitland Road.. .Apartment complex, apartment 201."
OPERATOR: "And what's the problem?"
MORRIS: "My breathing is very, very labored."
OPERATOR: "How old are you?"
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MORRIS: "Um, 55."
MORRIS: "I don't know if I have been, but I suspect that I might
have been exposed to anthrax."
OPERATOR: "Do you know when?"
MORRIS: "It was last, what, last Saturday a week ago, last
Saturday morning at work. I work for the Postal Service. I've
been to the doctor. I went to the doctor Thursday. He took a
culture, but he never got back to me with the results. I guess there
was some hang-up over the weekend, I'm not sure. But in the
meantime, I went through a achiness and head achiness; this
started Tuesday. Now I'm having difficulty breathing, and just to
move any distance, I feel like I'm going to pass out. I'm here at
the house; my wife is here. I'm on the couch."
OPERATOR: "Ok, which post office do you work at?"
MORRIS: "This is the post office downtown, um, Brentwood
Road, Washington D.C., post office. There was a woman found
an envelope, and I was in the vicinity. It had powder in it. They
never let us know whether the thing had anthrax or not. They
never treated the people who were around this particular
individual and the supervisor who handled the envelope, so I
don't know if it is or not ... I haven't been able to find out; I've
been calling. But the symptoms that I've had are what was
described to me in a letter they put out, almost to a T. Except I
haven't had any vomiting, except just until a few minutes ago.
I'm not bleeding, and I don't have diarrhea. The doctor thought
that it was just a virus or something, so we went with that, and I
was taking Tylenol for the achiness. Except the shortness of
breath now, I don't know, that's consistent with the, with the
anthrax."
OPERATOR: "Okay, you weren't the one that handled the
envelope, it was somebody else?"
MORRIS: "No, I didn't handle it, but I was in the vicinity."
OPERATOR: "Okay, and do you know what they did with the
envelope?"
MORRIS: "I don't know anything, I don't know anything. I
couldn't even find out if the stuff was or wasn't. I was told that it
wasn't, but I have a tendency not to believe these people. But
anyway, the woman who found it, her name was Helen ... she
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could probably tell you more about it, then I could. And the
supervisor who was involved, her name is Shirley...."'
The call ended at 4:50 a.m. Mr. Morris died just a few hours later at a local
hospital.
The tragic death of Mr. Morris, a 28 year veteran of the postal service,
from anthrax was but one instance of a much larger problem.4 The anthrax
crisis reaffirmed, after the horrific events of September 11, 2001, that
America's workers may be the targets of terrorist acts at work and that they
are vulnerable to such attacks, despite the protective efforts of employers,
government officials, and experts from the scientific and medical
communities. Should employees' vulnerability to attack simply be
dismissed as an inevitable consequence of the age in which we live?
Most would conclude no, particularly within the context of Mr.
Morris' infection and death from inhalational anthrax. Part II of this paper
addresses the Postal Service's anthrax crisis of 2001 up to the point that
Mr. Morris died on October 21, 2001. Part III considers what protections
he would have had if he had chosen not to go to work at various times in
relation to his encounter with a letter that he believed may have contained
anthrax. The resulting answers will show that workers in America are not
adequately legally protected against the threat of such attacks, and that their
right to refuse hazardous work in the face of terrorist attacks in the
workplace must be expanded, as recommended in Part IV, as one means of
better protecting them.
II. ANTHRAX AND THE MAIL -- 2001
"By its very nature bio-terrorism gives no warning. It creates fear.
Fear that if not dealt with in an honest, forthright manner-with
information-can cripple an organization or a nation.",
6
3. Id.
4. U. S. POSTAL SERV., Fact Sheet, 11 a.m. (October 24, 2001), available at
http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/anthrax
/USPS%20Fact%20Sheets/USPS%20Fact%20Sheet%200ct.%2024,%202001%20 11 am.PD
F (last visited July 11, 2002).
5. USPS officials declined to speak with the author and otherwise to provide requested
information to him regarding the anthrax crisis. See E-mail from Karen McAliley,
Executive Assistant to Susan F. Medvidovich, Senior Vice President, Human Resources
(June 5, 2002, 19:06 EST) (on file with author). The author presumes that this crisis was an
act of "terrorism," defined as "the systematic use of violence as a means to intimidate or
coerce societies or governments." See http://www.onelook.com/?loc=pub&w=terrorism.
The author notes that to date he is not aware of any published reports of any arrests being
made by law enforcement officials regarding the alleged perpetrator(s) behind this crisis.
6. Oversight of the U.S. Postal Service: Ensuring the Safety of Postal Employees and
the U.S. Mail, Before the House Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. (Oct. 2001)
[hereinafter House Oversight Hearings] (statement of John E. Potter, Postmaster
2003]
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Anthrax (B anthracis) is one of the most feared and potentially lethal
7biological weapons that a terrorist might use. The use of anthrax as a
weapon in the United States in 2001 caused twenty-two confirmed or
suspected cases of anthrax infection.8 People can be infected by touching it
(cutaneous anthrax), breathing it (inhalational anthrax), or by ingesting it
(gastrointestinal anthrax). 9 Inhalational anthrax is much more deadly than
is cutaneous anthrax, particularly if left untreated, and it is estimated that
inhalational anthrax would account for the largest number of deaths should
anthrax be released in an aerosolized form as a biological weapon in the
future.' ° Of the twenty-two confirmed or suspected cases in 2001, five
people died from inhalational anthrax while six others were infected but
survived, and the remaining eleven cases were cutaneous (either confirmed
or suspected) from which no one died." There were no reported cases of
gastrointestinal anthrax infection in 2001 in the United States. 2
Prior to the crisis of 2001, there were few cases of inhalational anthrax
infection in the United States and abroad. Between 1976 and 2001, there
were no reported cases of inhalational anthrax in the United States, and
between 1900 and 1976, there were only eighteen such reported cases,
which were primarily related to workers in textile mills who worked with
goat hair, goat skins, and wool.1" The only known epidemic of inhalational
anthrax occurred in 1979 in Russia after anthrax spores were accidentally
released from a Soviet bioweapons factory. 14  Additionally, anthrax
infection in humans can occur naturally as the result of contact with
animals or animal products that are infected with the disease, and
cutaneous anthrax is the most common form of infection from naturally
General/CEO, United States Postal Service) [hereinafter Potter Statement] (on file with the
U.S. House Comm. on Govt. Reform and with author).
7. THE WORKING GROUP ON CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE, Anthrax as a Biological Weapon,
2002, Updated Recommendations for Management, 287 JAMA 2 (May 2002).
8. Id. The author notes that the General Accounting Office reported that there were
twenty-three suspected cases of anthrax infection during the crisis of 2001. See U.S.
General Accounting Office Report, U.S. Postal Service: Better Guidance is Needed to
Improve Communication Should Anthrax Contamination Occur in the Future, GAO 03-316,
April 2003, 1.
9. 287 JAMA at 5.
10. Id. at 2, 5.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 2, 5; CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Bioterrorism Alleging Use of Anthrax and
Interim Guidelines for Management - United States, 1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REPT. 69 (1999); J.A. Jernigan et al., Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax -
The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 933,
941 (2001).
14. See THE WORKING GROUP ON CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE, supra note 7, at 2, 8 (noting
that mortality reports for those with inhalational anthrax from this incident range from 68
deaths of 79 total patients for one group, to 100 deaths of 250 total patients for another).
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occurring anthrax.' 5 In the United States, one case of cutaneous anthrax
was reported in 2000, while 224 cases were reported between 1944 and
1994.16
There were several instances in the United States where a powdery
substance, allegedly containing anthrax, was sent through the mail system
in an envelope or package, before 2001." All of these cases turned out to
be "hoaxes," yet they prompted the United States Postal Service (USPS) to
create a policy for dealing with such incidents in 1999.18 The USPS policy,
entitled "Emergency Response to Mail Allegedly Containing Anthrax,"
implied that hoaxes can leave employees and the community in need of
information and counseling, and the possibility of bioterrorism cannot be
ignored. The policy stated that "it is management's responsibility to
minimize potential exposures through quick isolation and evacuation until
emergency response and law enforcement can arrive and take control of the
incident."' 9
Despite the foresight of that policy, postal officials did not know that
anthrax spores could escape from a sealed envelope during the critical days
of the anthrax crisis. 20 They did not know this because throughout the
ordeal, they relied on the advice of officials from the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), who also did not know that anthrax spores could come out
of a sealed envelope during mail processing. According to Dr. Jeffrey
Koplan, then Director of the CDC, they did not realize that postal
employees could be at risk from the anthrax found in a highly contaminated
letter that was opened in Senator Tom Daschle's office on October 15:
[W]e were still operating on the assumption that in order for a
letter to convey this - the anthrax - it had to be either opened by
someone who was opening mail, or in some way torn or
disrupted in the sorting process, because the concept of powder in
a sealed letter was one that suggested it would stay with that
letter.2'
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
17. U. S. POSTAL SERV. MGMT. INSTRUCTION, Emergency Response to Mail Allegedly
Containing Anthrax, No. EL-860-1993-3, 1 (Oct. 4, 1999), available at
http://www.apwu.org/ departments/ir/s&h/anthrax/Anthrax%20Chronology.htm.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1, 2.
20. See Potter, supra note 6. See also David E. Rosenbaum & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A
Nation Challenged: The Disease; 2 Workers Die and 2 Are Ill at Capital's Postal Center;
Inhaled Anthrax Indicated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at Al (describing how postal
officials relied on CDC reports that anthrax could not escape from sealed envelopes).
21. Gina Kolata, A Nation Challenged: The Response; Many Lessons to be Learned
with Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at lB. Dr. Koplan resigned as Director on Feb.
21, 2002. Erin McClam, CDC Chief Jeffrey Koplan Resigns, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 21,
2002, at Al, available at http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/koplanresigns.html.
2003]
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Dr. David Satcher, the Surgeon General of the United States, affirmed
on NBC's "Today" show, as reported in The New York Times, that public
health officials were wrong about the possibility of anthrax spores escaping
from an envelope during mail processing, saying "'[t]he fact of the matter
is, we were wrong, because we haven't been here before."'
22
Although officials from the CDC were not aware of this possibility,
Canadian officials were well aware of it, prior to October 2001, based on
the results of two studies completed in April and September, 2001,
respectively. 23 The studies focused on the dispersal patterns of a powdery
substance, closely simulating bacillus anthrax, contained inside a normally
sealed envelope which was handled in a variety of ways and then opened
under controlled conditions. Each of the studies concluded, in part, that an
envelope would not have to be opened for one handling it or near it to be at
risk for contamination from the powder contained therein. One of the
studies ominously stated,
[T]hese experiments show that a real 'anthrax letter' would pose
a serious threat to not only the person opening the envelope but
to others in the room. If the envelope was not completely sealed
(e.g., specifically sealing the open corners), it could also pose a
24threat to individuals in the mail handling system.
The Canadian officials tried to warn CDC officials of their findings as
early as October 4, 2001, once the first case of anthrax infection from an
25employee of a Florida tabloid newspaper was publicized. Doctor
Kournikakis, who had taken part in the Canadian study published in
September, 2001, emailed a laboratory manager at the CDC on that date
regarding the Canadian studies, but the information was not reviewed until
approximately October 30, 2001, when another CDC official apparently
26learned about the Canadian studies. In an article in The Wall Street
Journal, Dr. Bradley Perkins, a CDC epidemiologist, defended the CDC's
actions in relation to the emailed Canadian studies by stating, "'[i]t is
22. Todd S. Purdum, A Nation Challenged: The Disease; More Checked for Anthrax;
U.S. Officials Acknowledge Underestimating Mail Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at Al.
23. M. Callaghan et al., Investigation on the Dispersal Patterns of Contaminants in
Letters, FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION SECTION, OTTAWA-CARLETON REGIONAL POLICE
SERVICES (April 9, 2001), available at http://hs.cupw.ca/pdfs/envelope-test-eng.pdf; B.
Kournikakis et al., Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters, DEFENSE RESEARCH
ESTABLISHMENT SUFFIELD, TECHNICAL REPORT (Sept. 2001) (copy provided to author by
William H. Kajola, Industrial Hygienist, Department of Occupational Safety and Health,
AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.) (on file with author).
24. Kournikakis, supra note 23, at 13.
25. Chad Terhune, Canadian Officials Did Research on Anthrax Before U.S. Attacks,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2001, reprinted by UCLA Department of Epidemiology, School of
Public Health, available at http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/canadianresearchanthrax.html.
26. Id.; see also David Brown, Canadian Study Shows Anthrax's Easy Spread; One
Letter Could Cause Many Deaths, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at A27.
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certainly relevant data, but I don't think it would have altered the decisions
that we made.'" Doctor Perkins went on to say that the CDC primarily
relied on the fact that no postal employees in Florida were infected from
the letter that contained anthrax that killed the employee from the mailroom
of the tabloid newspaper in early October 2001, and added, "'I think more
weight would have been put on the Florida experience and the absence of
demonstrated risk [among postal workers] than the experimental data.' '' 28
Gerry Kreienkamp, a spokesman for the U.S. Postal Service, said that
whether the USPS would have acted more aggressively after the letter to
Senator Daschle was opened would have depended on whether the CDC
had given them different advice at the time.29 He stated, "'[w]e're not in
the public-health field and we don't keep up with the latest research.""'3
An article in The New York Times, however, quoted Dr. David Fleming, the
CDC's Deputy Director, as stating, "'[i]f we had any suspicion that there
was a risk of inhalation anthrax in any of the workers down the line, we
would have moved to aggressively track that down... I think knowing
what we know now, different actions might have prevented the illnesses
from occurring.' 31
Increased knowledge from the data in the Canadian studies,
particularly when considered with the benefit of hindsight, may very well
have changed the advice that CDC officials gave, but their advice was
clearly wrong in this case. Tragically, it took the deaths of two postal
employees, Mr. Thomas Morris, Jr., and Mr. Joseph Curseen, Jr., to
illustrate the point made in those studies. Both men were long time postal
employees, were members of the American Postal Workers Union
(APWU) and were assigned to Brentwood.32 At a memorial service for
each, Postmaster General Potter hailed them as "[p]erfect examples of what
makes the Postal Service great.., our people. 33
The anthrax outbreak of 2001 began in Florida, when two employees
27. Terhune, supra note 25.
28. Terhune, supra note 25. Dr. Kournikakis was quoted as saying it would have been
a "difficult call" for CDC officials on whether to give antibiotics to postal workers based on
the opening of the letter to Senator Daschle alone, even if they had been aware of his study,
because the letter to Senator Daschle was heavily taped on the ends, while the letter used in
his study was not so taped.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged: The Response; Officials
Admit Underestimating Danger Posed to Postal Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at Al.
32. Tanya N. Ballard, Families, Colleagues Grieve for Postal Workers Who Died From
Anthrax, Gov. EXEC. MAGAZINE, Nov. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.govexec.com/news/index..cfm?mode=report&articleid=21633&printerfriendlyV
ers=l&; House Oversight Hearings, supra note 6, (testimony of William Burrus, president-
elect, American Postal Workers Union) [hereinafter Burrus testimony].
33. Ballard, supra note 32.
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for the tabloid newspaper, The Sun, got sick.34 The first employee was a
photo editor for the newspaper who first became ill on September 27, 2001.
He was taken to a hospital for treatment on October 2, 2001, was diagnosed
with inhalational anthrax after being hospitalized for approximately 24
hours, and died on October 5, 2001. 35 The second employee of The Sun
had delivered mail to the first The Sun employee, and became slightly ill on
September 24, 2001.36 His symptoms worsened over the next few days,
and he was admitted to the hospital on October 1, 2001 . He was
diagnosed with inhalational anthrax on October 5 and remained
hospitalized until his release on October 23.38
Officials from the CDC and various state public health officials in
Florida conducted environmental testing at The Sun's (American Media
Inc.) facilities, where the two patients worked.39  One environmental
sample from the building was positive for anthrax, and a nasal sample from
another employee at the building was also positive for anthrax. 40 The CDC
publicly reported these results on October 12, 2001, although members of
the United States Postal Inspection Service had begun working with other
law enforcement officials investigating the case on October 8, 2001.41
Officials from the USPS also began taking aggressive measures to
communicate with management personnel and USPS employees regarding
the possibility of anthrax contaminated mail. For example, on October 10,
2001, USPS executives sent a memo to various postal managers in the
USPS regarding the need to be prepared to respond to emergencies through
41the proper maintenance and reliance on Emergency Action Plans. Public
34. Katherine Mclntire Peters, Biological Terrorism Threat Commands Attention, Gov.
EXEC. MAGAZINE, Oct. 9, 2001, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1001/
100901kpl.htm. See also Jernigan, supra note 13, at 933-34.
35. Jernigan, supra note 13, at 933-34.
36. Id. at 934.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 933-36.
39. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Notice to Readers: Ongoing Investigation of Anthrax -
-Florida, October 2001, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 877 (2001), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preiew/mmwrhtml/mm5040a5.htm.
40. Id.
41. Id.; Press Releases, United States Postal Service News: Statement of Postmaster
General/CEO John E. Potter, USPS working with Law Enforcement Agencies on Boca Raton
Cases (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://www.usps.gov/news/2001 /
press/pr0L_1008pmg.htm. In FY 1999 and FY 2000, "there were approximately 178
Anthrax threats received at courthouses, reproductive health service providers ..., churches,
schools and post offices, and that 60 such threats were received in FY 2001." See also
Potter Statement, supra note 6, at 5.
42. Memorandum from USPS to Vice Presidents, Area Operations Manager, Capital
Metro Operations, Re: Emergency Action Plans (Oct. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/anthrax/Other%20USPS%201nformation/October
%2010th%20-%20Emergency%20Action%20Plans.PDF. The USPS' policy, ELM § 850-
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Affairs personnel for USPS also issued a statement on the same day
regarding safe mail handling procedures, which was to be copied and
posted on all employee bulletin boards, and which indicated in part that
there was no known link between the two employees who died in Florida
from anthrax and the mail. The statement also gave directions for
employees on how to deal with a piece of opened mail that a customer
might bring in, fearing it contained anthrax, and also how to react to a
customer who might reject receipt of a piece of mail because of fear of
anthrax contamination.43
At the same time, the number of anthrax cases continued to grow. On
October 9, 2001, CDC officials were notified by New York City public
health officials of a person with a skin lesion that was suspected and later
confirmed to be cutaneous anthrax.44  By October 16, two cases of
cutaneous anthrax had been confirmed in New York City. One of the
infected persons, an employee at NBC News, handled a letter at work
which was postmarked September 18, that contained a powder which was
later confirmed to be anthrax.45 The second person with cutaneous anthrax
was a seven month old baby who had been taken to his mother's workplace
on September 28.46
On October 11 and 12, 2001, USPS officials sent additional
information to its postmasters, supervisors, and employees about proper
procedures for handling mail that was suspected of being contaminated
with anthrax, or some other type of chemical or biological weapon, and
also information regarding anthrax in general. 47 The opening sentence of
2001-2, required all postal facilities with more than ten employees to have a written
emergency action plan, while those facilities with less than ten employees could verbally
communicate a plan among the employees. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE MGMT.
INSTRUCTION, Emergency Evacuation and Fire Prevention, EL-850-2001-2, available at
http://www.apwu.org/departments/ ir/s&h/anthrax/Anthrax%20Chronology.htm.
43. Safe Mail Handling Procedures -- They Are Very Important, Especially Now,
USPSNEwsBREAK P.M., Oct. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/anthrax/uspsnewsbreaks/uspsnewsbreak%20p.m.
%200ct.%2010,%202001%20430pm.PDF.
44. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Update: Investigation of Anthrax Associated with
Intentional Exposure and Interim Public Health Guidelines, October 2001, 50 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 889, 889-893 (2001), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm504 lal.htm.
45. Id.; Gloves and Masks: Let's Talk About Your Safety, Special Edition,
USPSNEwSTALK, Oct. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/anthrax[USPSNEWSTALK/USPSNEWSTALK%
200ct.%2015,%20200 I.PDF.
46. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 44.
47. Zero Incidents Confirmed: No Biological Or Chemical Weapons Transported by
Mail, USPSNEwSTALK, SPECIAL EDITION, FOR POSTAL SUPERVISORS AND POSTMASTERS,
Oct. 11, 2001, available at http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/
anthrax/USPSNEWSTALK/USPSNEWSTALK%200ct.%2011,%202001%20Special%20E
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each of these statements articulated what had become a common theme
from postal officials: "There have been no confirmed incidents of chemical
or biological weapons transported by mail. 48  One of the documents
entitled "Mandatory Safety Talk on Anthrax," which was sent to
postmasters, district managers, and plant managers on October 11, 2001,
also gave explicit instructions for employees, supervisors, and managers,
regarding the appropriate steps to take in response to "suspicious looking
mail piece(s). 49
Despite the repeated message that there were no confirmed cases of
the use of the mail to send chemical or biological weapons, it is clear that
authorities, including postal authorities, suspected that anthrax may have
been sent through the mail, given the substance of the messages being sent
and given the involvement of Postal Inspection Service investigators in the
criminal investigation of the Florida cases as of October 8, 2001.50 Postal
officials were clearly wrestling with a growing crisis that presented a
dilemma of immense proportions: the balancing of considerations of
worker safety against the public's confidence in the safety of the mail and
the devastating financial impact that a significant disruption of mail service
would certainly bring."1 In the midst of the crisis, Postmaster General
Potter told a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations that
the combined losses for the postal service of responding to the anthrax
crisis, along with declining revenues exasperated both by the events of
September 11 th and the anthrax crisis because of decreased mail use, could
dition.PDF; Keeping employees in the know about handling suspicious parcels,
USPSNEwsBREAK A.M., Oct. 12, 2001, available at http://www.apwu.org/departments/
ir/s&h/anthrax/uspsnewsbreaks/uspsnewsbreak%20a.m.%200ct.%2012,%202001%2010am
.PDF.
48. USPSNEwSTALK, SPECIAL EDITION, supra note 47; USPSNEwSBREAK A.M., supra
note 47.
49. USPSNEWsBREAK A.M., supra note 47; see also UNITED STATES POSTAL SERV.,
Mandatory Safety Talk on Anthrax (Oct. 12 2001), at 2, available at
http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/anthrax/uspsnewsbreaks/uspsnewsbreak%20a.m.
%200ct.%2012,%202001%2010am.PDF.
50. See Potter Statement, supra note 6. "Early on, when there was confusion about
how and when anthrax got to American Media in Boca Raton, we saw no direct connection
to the Postal Service and the system that delivers the mail. Nevertheless, on Tuesday,
October 9th, as a precaution, we provided supervisors and employees with updated
information on what to do if they suspected biohazards in the mail."
5 1. The USPS delivers approximately 608 million pieces of mail a day. As of October
15, 2001, this meant that postal officials had delivered more than 18 billion pieces of mail
since September 11, 2001, alone. Gloves And Masks Are Okay Where They Do Not Create
a Hazardous Situation, USPSNEwsBREAK P.M, Oct. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/anthrax/uspsnewsbreaks/uspsnewsbreak%20p.m.
%200ct.%2015,%202001%208pm.PDF. "It's not far-fetched to imagine that this could hurt
us to the tune of several billion dollars." Potter Statement, supra note 6. See also David E.
Sanger & Neil A. Lewis, Officials Fail to Guarantee Mail Is Not Contaminated, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001, at B9.
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reach $5 billion for the fiscal year.52
Postal officials definitively knew of a link between the mail and
anthrax on October 13, 2001, when they learned that the infection of an
employee of NBC News in New York City had been caused by exposure to
contaminated mail in her workplace. 53 This information prompted USPS
officials to order testing for anthrax exposure of postal employees at the
main post office in Boca Raton, FL, because this post office provided mail
service to the offices of American Media Inc., where the first two cases of
anthrax infection developed.54 While all of the tests returned negative, 30
of the 109 employees at the facility began taking antibiotics as a
precautionary measure, and environmental testing of the facility found
"trace results of anthrax . . .,,"
On Monday, October 15, the pace of developments increased
exponentially for postal officials and others involved in the rapidly
expanding crisis. On that day, officials told postal employees that
employees from the Boca Raton facility had tested negative for exposure to
anthrax, and also told them that a "miniscule amount of anthrax spores
were found in a small, non-public area of the Boca Raton post office."56
The same message added that employees who were potentially at risk for
exposure to anthrax were placed on antibiotics the previous week, and
stated that public health officials did not recommend any further testing or
medical treatment for other postal employees at the Boca Raton post office,
visitors who had been to the post office, or for persons who received mail
from that facility.57
At this point, postal officials, along with the public health officials
who were advising them, knew that anthrax had been carried through the
mail on at least one occasion (the NBC employee case), and must have
realized that anthrax had escaped from an envelope or package during mail
processing at the Boca Raton post office, based on the presence of a
"miniscule" amount of anthrax in the Boca Raton post office. How else
could a "miniscule" amount of anthrax have gotten into a small, non-public
area of the Boca Raton post office?
52. Financial Security of the U.S. Postal Serv., Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Treasury and General Gov. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. (Nov. 8, 2001)
(statement of Postmaster General/CEO John E. Potter) [hereinafter Potter Statement 11],
available at http://www.usps.com/news/200 I / press/prO 1-_ 1108pmg-print.htm.
53. House Oversight Hearings, supra note 6; and Potter Statement, supra note 6.
54. See Potter Statement, supra note 6; CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Investigation of
Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax and Interim Guidelines for Exposure Management and
Antimicrobial Therapy, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REPORT 909 (2001).
55. Potter Statement, supra note 6.
56. Boca Raton Employees Test Negative for Anthrax, USPSNEwsBREAK P.M., Oct. 15,
2001, available at http://www.apwu.org/anthrax.bocapo.htm.
57. Id.
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Postal officials continued to try to communicate with postal
employees on October 15. At 2 p.m. that day, USPS officials issued a
statement, to be copied and posted on all employee bulletin boards,
providing that employees who wished to wear gloves and masks while
handling mail could do so if they so chose.58 The statement also added,
"[tlhere has been one incidence of anthrax bacteria being delivered through
the mail, the first documented case of a hazardous biological substance sent
through the U.S. Mail."59  Postal officials also sent out a notice to
supervisors and postmasters on the same day, requiring them to provide
and document "stand up talks" to postal employees regarding biological
substances, anthrax, and emergency action plans. 60 This message also told
supervisors and postmasters to tell window clerks and other employees
who handle the mail to no longer "deliberately shake or empty the contents
of any suspicious envelope or package," which was a change in policy from
what they had been telling them in the past.6' This change in policy clearly
indicates that postal officials now believed that anthrax could escape from
an envelope or package during mail processing, at least if it was shaken by
a mail handler, and was apparently based on a CDC Health Advisory that
was issued through the Health Alert Network on October 12.62
Postal officials also formed a Mail Security Task Force on October 15
to help facilitate their response to the quickly expanding crisis. 6' This team
consisted of personnel from the Postal Inspection Service, the Office of
Inspector General, Postal Service medical and safety professions,
management officials, union officials, and mailers. 64 This task force served
as a conduit for outside experts, such as members of the CDC among
others, to advise postal officials regarding the situation, and it also included
representatives of the APWU, along with officials from other postal unions
as well as representatives of non-union employees.65
Monday the 15th was a watershed day for another reason. That is
when an anthrax laced letter was first discovered on Capitol Hill. On that
day, an aide to Senator Tom Daschle opened an envelope that was sealed
58. Employees Who Handle Mail Can Use Gloves or Masks If They Wish,
USPSNEwSBREAK P.M., Oct. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.apwu.org/anthrax.gloves.htm.
59. Id.
60. Gloves and Masks: Let's Talk About Your Safety, USPSNEwsTALK, SPECIAL
EDITION, Oct. 15, 2001, available at http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/anthrax
/USPSNEWSTALK/USPSNEWSTALK%200ct.%2015,%202001 .PDF
61. Id.
62. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Health Advisory, How to Handle Anthrax and Other
Biological Agent Threats (Oct. 12, 2001), at http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/
anthrax/CDC/CDC%20%20AIert%200ctober%2012.pdf.
63. Potter Statement, supra note 6.
64. Id.
65. Potter Statement, supra note 6; Burrus Statement, supra note 32.
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with tape and filled with approximately two grams of a powdery substance
at the senator's office complex in the Hart Senate Office Building.66 One
reporter described the opening of the envelope as "releasing a puff of
spores. 67  Senator Daschle's office was quickly quarantined, the mail
system for the Capitol was shut down, public tours of the Capitol were
stopped, and numerous people who worked in or near the offices of Senator
Daschle were prescribed the antibiotic Cipro, along with being tested for
anthrax.6s Nasal swab tests, although now deemed unreliable for diagnosis
of inhalational anthrax infection, were positive for anthrax in twenty-eight
people who were in or around Senator Daschle's office at the time the letter
was opened, and for six persons who were "first responders" to the
incident.69 Environmental tests confirmed what had been suspected-that
anthrax spores had been aerosolized, and led authorities to shut down the
building of approximately 1 million square feet on October 17.70 A second
contaminated letter, sent to Senator Patrick Leahy, was not discovered until
November 17 because it was impounded with other mail once the letter to
Senator Daschle was first discovered.7' The path that these letters took,
particularly through Brentwood, proved to have a devastating effect on
several postal employees including Thomas Morris, Jr.
The letters to Senators Daschle and Leahy had been processed through
Brentwood on Friday, October 12, 2001. 7' Both letters were processed at
7:10 a.m. for delivery through bar-code sorter seventeen (DBCS 17), a
machine through which envelopes travel for sorting at a high rate of speed
and through which the envelopes are "pinched" at various points while
being processed. This machine was later cleaned, sometime between 8
a.m. and 9:40 a.m. the same morning, with a strong blast of compressed air,
66. See THE WORKING GROUP ON CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE, supra note 7, at 4; and Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, A Nation Challenged: The Government Response; A Quick Response for
Politicians; A Slower Onefor Mail Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at Al.
67. Andrew C. Revkin, A Nation Challenged: The Daschle Letter; Trail of Death and
Illness on a Tainted Letter's Path, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001, at Al.
68. Stolberg, supra note 66.
69. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 54, at 912.
70. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Evaluation of Bacillus Anthracis Contamination
Inside the Brentwood Mail Processing and Distribution Center--District of Columbia, 50
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1129 (2001); John Heilprin, Fear Surrounds Hart
Reopening, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 22, 2002, available at
www.canoe.ca/CNEWSAttack02Ol/ 22_hart-ap.html. The Hart Senate Office Building
remained closed for decontamination until January 22, 2002. Cleanup costs were estimated
between $14 million and $23 million. See also THE WORKING GROUP ON CIVILIAN
BIODEFENSE, supra note 7, at 23.
71. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 70, at 1129-33.
72. Id. at 1129.
73. Id.; See also Interview with Corey Thompson, Safety Director, American Postal
Worker's Union, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 5, 2002).
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which was the typical practice at that time.74 It appears that this stage in the
processing, along with other points where the envelopes would have been
moved around by sorting and transporting machines, is where spores would
have come out of the envelopes and potentially aerosolized into the
surrounding environment.75 The subsequent blast of compressed air to
clean the DBCS 17 would likely have helped with the aerosolization and
76spreading of the released spores. Mr. Morris must have been exposed to
spores of anthrax while working between Friday, October 12, and Tuesday,
October 16, even though he apparently did not realize it at the time. His
lack of knowledge about the definite time of exposure reflects one of the
greatest dangers of an aerosolized release of anthrax, that it is potentially
"colorless and invisible. 77
Officials from the CDC and USPS knew on Monday, October 15, that
the contaminated letter to Senator Daschle had passed through Brentwood,
but no environmental testing was done there until Thursday, October 18.78
Authorities were apparently so confident that there was no danger at
Brentwood that they held a press conference there on Thursday the 18th to
announce the offering of a $1 million reward for information leading to the
discovery of those behind the anthrax crisis. 79 Brentwood was not closed
down until Sunday, October 21, when Mr. Leroy Richmond, a postal
employee at Brentwood, was diagnosed with inhalational anthrax after
being hospitalized at a Virginia hospital on Friday, October 19.80 Further,
no postal employees from Brentwood were tested or given antibiotics
during the critical days between the 15th and 21st.8 Even though officialsinvolved in this crisis have repeatedly said that this is not a time or case for
74. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 70, at 1129.
75. Id. at 1132.
76. Id. The use of compressed air to clean sorting machines has been discontinued, and
postal employees now use a vacuum system to help avoid this type of situation. See also
Revkin, supra note 67.
77. THE WORKING GROUP ON CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE, supra note 7, at 4. According to
one emergency responder, "'The problem is, you can't assess the damage by just being
there, like you can with something else. With the World Trade Center, you know what you
have. It's totally different [with anthrax]. You're not even sure if you have a problem when
you get a call for anthrax in the post office .... You can't see the hazards you're dealing
with."' Conference Proceedings, Protecting Emergency Responders, Lessons Learned from
Terrorist Attacks, RAND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY INSTITUTE (Dec. 9, 2001),
available at http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF176/CF176.pdf.
78. Potter Statement, supra note 6. According to Postmaster General Potter, the initial
environmental tests were negative for anthrax and they had to await results of more
comprehensive laboratory tests of additional samples which took between 48 hours to 72
hours to process.
79. Id.
80. Id. See also Diana Jean Schemo, Postal Employee in Washington Has Anthrax in
Lungs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at Al.
81. Potter Statement, supra note 6.
REFUSING HAZARDOUS WORK
finger pointing, this delayed response was critical and almost certainly
contributed to Mr. Morris' death.82
Mr. Morris first felt sick on Tuesday, October 16, when he had a
fever, cough, and other symptoms. 83 On Thursday, October 18, he went to
a local medical center and told the treating nurse practitioner that he
thought he might have been exposed to anthrax because of where he
worked and because of what had occurred with the envelope with powder
in it. 4 He was diagnosed with a virus and was sent home without being
prescribed antibiotics. 85  During the early morning hours of Sunday,
October 21, his symptoms worsened to the point that he called 911 for
help. 86 His fearful pleas for help and the subsequent treatment that he
received proved too late as he died later on Sunday at a D.C.-area
81hospital.
In his 911 call, Mr. Morris said that he was in the vicinity of an
envelope that a female co-worker found one week earlier, on Saturday,
October 13. He said that the envelope had powder in it and that they
reported it to their supervisor at the time. He also said that he was never
told whether or not it was anthrax, although he also said that he was "told
that it wasn't, but I have a tendency not to believe these people."89 It is
unclear whether his assertions were accurate regarding whether he was told
of the results of any testing on the contents of the letter, but it would be
hard to imagine that he would lie given the circumstances under which he
made his 911 call.
In a press release on November 7, the same day that the text of Mr.
Morris' 911 call was being released to the media, USPS officials first
confirmed the fact that there was a letter with powder in it, as Mr. Morris
had alleged. 90 It was not until the next day, November 8, that USPS
82. Id. Postmaster General Potter stated: "Last week I said, this is not a time for finger
pointing. I underscore that again. The mail and the Nation have never experienced
anything like this."
83. Jernigan. supra note 13, at 933, 937.
84. Associated Press, supra note 1; Estate of Thomas L. Morris, Jr. v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, No. 02-07682 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2002). The author notes
that this case was removed to United States District Court, D. Md., in April 2002.
85. Jernigan, supra note 13, at 933, 937.
86. Associated Press, supra note 1.
87. Jernigan, supra note 13, at 933, 937.
88. Estate of Thomas L. Morris, Jr., supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. Press Release, Statement-On the 911 telephone call made by the late Thomas L.
Morris Jr., UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE NEWS, Nov. 7, 2001, available at
http://www.usps.com/news/2001/press/pr01l l07statement-print.htm. At the top of the
statement of 4:25 p.m. is a box with a notation, issued at 7:50 p.m., November 7, 2001,
providing information regarding the testing of the envelope that Mr. Morris discussed in his
911 call.
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officials publicly asserted, for the first time, that Mr. Morris had been told
that the test results for the letter with powder in it were negative for
anthrax. Their statement read in part: "The letter tested negative and
Brentwood employees, including Morris, were told of the results. From the
day the Daschle letter was opened until Morris' death, public health
authorities unanimously assured the Postal Service that workers in the
Brentwood facility were not at risk."91
On the same day, several comments about the envelope with powder
that Mr. Morris mentioned were attributed in various news stories to
Deborah Willhite, a senior vice president with USPS. In an Associated
Press (AP) story of November 8, 2001, Ms. Willhite was quoted as saying
regarding this issue, "'We don't know for certain what he is talking
about... I'm not downplaying what Mr. Morris experienced because we
don't know for sure, but it could or could not be a significant lead ... We
simply won't know until we can reconstruct what went on at that point in
time.' ,92  The same AP story indicated that Ms. Willhite said that
investigators had started interviewing Mr. Morris' co-workers as of
"Wednesday" to try and determine what had occurred regarding the
envelope in question, but that this was difficult for them to do because
work records inside Brentwood had been sealed up when the building was
closed on October 21.9' In a separate news story in The New York Times on
November 8, Ms. Willhite reportedly said, "'When the letter was called to
the supervisor's attention, the supervisor set it aside and turned it over to
the inspector on duty. The inspector gave it to the FBI. The FBI sent it to
be tested. It tested negative."' 94 She added that the Brentwood employees
had been told of the negative test results in a "'stand-up talk'," although
she apparently did not disclose any further information at that time about
the date the talk was given or whether or not Mr. Morris had been at work
or was otherwise present for the briefing. 95 In the complaint of a wrongful
death lawsuit filed by Mr. Morris' estate and surviving family members
against his healthcare provider, the plaintiffs have asserted that Mr. Morris
was never told of the results of any testing on the envelope with powder
91. TV stations air Morris 911 tape, USPS calls death a tragedy: "He is a victim of
terrorism," USPSNEWSBREAK A.M., Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://www.usps.com/news/
2001/press/pr0l1 108_91 l.htm.
92. Postal Inspectors Investigate Dying Worker's 911 Call About a Tainted Letter,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://www.courttv.com/assault on-america/
1108911 call ap.html.
93. Id. The article implies that the "Wednesday" Ms. Willhite referred to was
Wednesday, November 7, 2001.
94. David E. Rosenbaum, A Nation Challenged: The Disease; Worker Who Died
Suspected Anthrax Was Root of Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at B9.
95. Id.
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that he mentioned in his 911 call.96
Ms. Willhite's public comments raise a troubling question of whether
or not postal officials followed their own policy of October 1999 regarding
the proper response to envelopes suspected of anthrax contamination. 97
Were emergency response personnel ever involved in the incident? If so,
then why would postal investigators have waited until after Brentwood was
closed down on Sunday, October 21, to gather the facts about the suspected
letter from October 13, particularly in the midst of the anthrax crisis that
was quickly burgeoning beyond control? Despite the fact that the letter
ultimately tested negative for anthrax, it is important to consider whether
enough attention was paid to the incident when it occurred, by persons at
the proper levels of authority. If the importance of the letter of October 13
did not register on that day or the next as a cause for concern, then it seems
it certainly should have registered as of Monday night, October 15, when
postal officials and CDC officials knew that the letter to Senator Daschle
had been processed through Brentwood (that is assuming that CDC
officials were actually told of the suspected letter before it was too late).98
While these issues remain unsettled, of this one can be certain-Mr.
Morris' died primarily because of terrorist activity that he encountered
while at work, and that before he died, he experienced the type of fear
which is a key by-product of terrorist activity.99 His pleas for help in his
911 call reflect this fear, as USPS officials acknowledged in their statement
of November 7, which read: "The 911 call Mr. Morris placed early on the
day he died shows that his body was telling him something that no one else
had. He was deeply-and justifiably--worried .... All of us would feel
the same."'0° His death also shows that in this case information alone was
not enough to successfully combat both the fear and the deadly results of
the terrorist act to which he fell prey.' 0'
While the purpose of this article is not to assign blame for Mr. Morris'
death, it is clear that grave mistakes were made, particularly by officials
from the CDC, which directly affected the decisions of USPS officials and
which, in hindsight, partially contributed to Mr. Morris' death. The
situation was certainly frantic and many decisions had to be made rapidly
with less than perfect data upon which to base them. Authorities were
faced with a terrorist act which exceeded the known bounds of science-at
least the bounds of science known to officials from the CDC, as opposed to
Canadian officials-at the crucial time.
96. Estate of Thomas L. Morris, Jr., supra note 84.
97. See U.S. POSTAL SERV. MGMT. INSTRUCTION, supra note 17.
98. See Potter Statement, supra note 6.
99. Id.
100. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE NEWS, supra note 90.
101. See Potter Statement, supra note 6.
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Mr. Morris' employer did not prevent him from being infected by
anthrax while he was at work. Neither did officials from the CDC, along
with the myriad of other experts who were working on the case. His
vulnerability to attack raises the crucial question of whether he could have
successfully tried to protect himself in that situation by choosing not to go
to work at Brentwood at various times in the midst of this crisis.
III. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE HAZARDOUS WORK AMIDST THE ANTHRAX
CRISIS OF 2001
A. The Right to Refuse Hazardous Work - Varied Rights from Varied
Sources
The sources and standards of law that provide employees with the
right to refuse hazardous work generally fall into one of four categories:
those that are tied to the concept of concerted activity under federal labor
law, those that exist for employees covered by a collective bargaining
agreement containing a no-strike clause, those found in state and local
laws, and those rights provided to employees through 29 C.F.R. §
1977.12(b)(2). The scope of an employee's right to refuse hazardous work
can vary greatly, depending upon the source from which it flows. '0'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects a
covered employee's right "to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection ... ."'03 An employee's rights under § 7
have been held to include the right to refuse to work because of adverse
health or safety conditions, where such activity on the part of the employee
is deemed to be protected, concerted activity.' °4 The conditions under
which a covered employee can exercise the right to refuse hazardous work
under § 7 will vary depending on whether the employee is represented by a
union and covered by a collective bargaining agreement with the
employer.
10 5
Employees not represented by a union, who concertedly refuse to
perform a task that they honestly believe to be dangerous, will be protected
102. See generally, Larry C. Backer, Note, Refusals of Hazardous Work Assignments: A
Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 544 (1981).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2003).
104. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); NLRB v. City
Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984); Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (1986)
("Meyers IF'), enforced, Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
105. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 15.
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under § 7 of the NLRA, even if their belief about the danger is deemed
unreasonable.' °6 In contrast, if the employee is represented by a union and
is subject to a collective bargaining agreement, then the employee's refusal
to perform assigned work based upon safety or health concerns flowing
from the collective bargaining agreement will be upheld so long as the
employee's conduct is "reasonably directed toward the enforcement of a
collectively bargained right," and so long as the employee has an honest
and reasonable belief that the situation violates the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement, whether or not the employee's belief is
ultimately proven to be correct.
10 7
Where employees are represented by a union and are subject to the
provisions of a no strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, a
union must generally "present 'ascertainable, objective evidence supporting
its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists"' in
order for a work stoppage to be upheld under § 502 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. 10 8  Section 502 provides, in part, that the
quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of
abnormally dangerous conditions for work shall not be deemed a strike.'09
The Supreme Court initially ruled that this provision provided a "limited
exception to an express or implied no-strike obligation."'' 0
In TNS, Inc. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO,"' a remanded case of first impression, the NLRB
106. See id. See also NLRB v. Tamara Foods, Inc., 692 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982);
Odyssey Capital Group and Phillip D. Demas, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 61 (2000) (holding that
the NLRB will not impose an objective reasonableness standard in these situations).
107. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 837, 840 (1984). The NLRB's Interboro
doctrine provides that an "individual's assertion of a right grounded in a collective-
bargaining agreement is recognized as 'concerted activit[y]' and therefore accorded the
protection of § 7." Id. (citing Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966)).
See also NLRB v. PIE Nationwide, Inc., 923 F.2d 506, 515 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating,
"[t]hough incorrect... an employee's understanding of the collective bargaining agreement
may nevertheless be reasonable.")
108. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974)
(quoting Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am. 466 F.2d 1157, 1162 (1971)
(Rosenn, J., dissenting)); See also NLRB v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208,
1209 (1961) (requiring affirmative demonstration of an abnormally dangerous condition to
uphold a work stoppage).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 143.
110. Gateway Coal Co., 414 US at 385. (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 519 F.2d 1155 (3rd Cir. 1975), which asserted that "[t]he word
'strike' is generally understood to mean a cessation of work by employees, accompanied by
picket lines which in combination impair or prevent production in all of the employer's
premises." Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 142(2) (2002), "strike" "includes any strike or other
concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration
of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted
interruption of operations by employees."
11. TNS, Inc. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 329
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determined that a work stoppage by employees when faced with the
dangers of cumulative exposure to radioactive and toxic substances at work
was justified under § 502 and thus was not an illegal strike.'1 2 In TNS Inc.,
the NLRB relied on the definition of the term "'abnormal"' as "'deviating
from the normal condition or from the norm or average,"' and adopted the
following test to determine whether work stoppages protesting employee
exposure to cumulative, slow-acting dangers are protected under § 502. 113
The General Counsel must show,
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employees believed
in good-faith that their working conditions were abnormally
dangerous; that their belief was a contributing cause of the work
stoppage; that the employees' belief is supported by
ascertainable, objective evidence; and that the perceived danger
posed an immediate threat of harm to employee health or
safety."1
4
In formulating this test, the Board rejected an assertion that § 502 should
apply "only when the General Counsel has proved that working conditions
were in fact abnormally dangerous." 115
In the TNS, Inc. case, the NLRB concluded that the employees were
justified in walking off the job because of their good faith belief that they
were being exposed to harmful amounts of radiation and other toxins while
at work, and because their belief was reasonably based on the objective
evidence provided in the case. u 6 The objective evidence included evidence
that the facility's air quality exceeded permissible limits in the months
immediately prior to the strike, that the employees' extended use of
respirators was negatively effecting their health, that the "'employees'
average whole body uranium exposures were far greater than those typical
for the nuclear industry,"' and that repeatedly high levels of uranium found
in employees' urine illustrated high risk of kidney damage among the
employees." 7 An additional piece of objective evidence was that these
conditions were not alleviated "'because Respondent failed to comply
N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1999) [hereinafter TNS, Inc.].
112. Id. The Board determined that because the employees were protected under § 502,
they were not economic strikers and could not be permanently replaced by their employer.
113. Id. at 607 (quoting Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 894 (1962),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964)).
114. Id. at 606.
115. Id. at 603, n.7 (emphasis in original). See Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 348
(1974) (rejecting adherence to a ".safe-in-fact' standard" under § 502 in a case where an
employee refused to drive a truck because he believed it was unsafe, and the truck was
subsequently driven nearly 800 miles without incident). But see infra, Part IV.
116. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 609 (quoting the administrative law judge's
decision).
117. Id.
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diligently with governmental codes prescribing sound health physics
practices."" 8 Because some of this evidence was readily observable and
thus known to the employees in the months immediately prior to the
walkout, the NLRB reasoned that the employees' conclusion regarding the
immediate nature of the danger present was adequately supported. "19
The NLRB also indicated that it would consider in future cases, on a
case-by-case basis, some or all of the following factors,
whether conditions appeared to be deviating from the norm or
from a reasonable level of risk; whether equipment intended to
protect employees from exposure to toxic substances appeared to
be operating in a manner sufficient to afford such protection;
whether employees had received sufficient instruction in the use
of safety equipment to render that equipment effective; and
whether management policies mandated and supported the proper
use of safety equipment and standards for handling dangerous
substances; any negative evaluations from regulatory agencies
and any failure of the employer to correct serious infractions. 1
20
Regarding the issue of whether employees were facing "'an
immediate, presently existing danger," 2'' the Board concluded that the
danger must have been direct and existing at the time that the walkout
began, but also concluded that in instances of employees being exposed to
cumulative dangers,
the issue will not be whether employees should suddenly leave,
but rather whether a presently existing, reasonable possibility of
serious incipient or future illness or injury existed. In some
instances, when latency periods have run their course, historical
analysis may sadly prove that employees waited far too long to
cease work in order to protect themselves from such immediate
dangers.122
Finally, the NLRB noted that the parties in the case had relied on
evidence that arose after the work stoppage took place and that none of the
parties had objected to the use of such evidence. 12 The Board stated that
when such objections are made, "[w]e shall consider them in deciding the
relevance and weight to be accorded the evidence under the totality of
circumstances presented in that particular case."''2 4 The Board added that
such evidence could be relevant as it confirms whether the employees'
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 608.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 608, n.31.
124. Id.
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belief about the existence of abnormally dangerous conditions was
supported by "'ascertainable, objective"' facts.1
5
In TNS, Inc., the NLRB reviewed its past decisions regarding the types
of ascertainable, objective evidence required under § 502 in order to
"support employees' good faith belief that the perceived dangers at their
workplace pose an immediate threat of harm to their health and safety."
2 6
In so doing, the Board observed that the cases seemed to fall within two
broad categories. The first involves cases where "risks that are ordinarily
present have been intensified."'' 27 The second category consists of cases
where the NLRB found that abnormally dangerous conditions did not exist,
against the background of a workplace in which the work carried inherent
dangers.128 The NLRB affirmed the importance of the principle expressed
by the Supreme Court in Gateway Coal, that an employee's "purely
subjective impression of danger will not suffice,"'129 nor would a
"speculative doubt about safety . ,, 30 However, the Board went on to say
that the General Counsel would not be required to show that injury had
already occurred; "rather, the reference point for assessing Section 502
coverage will be the conditions in a facility as they presented themselves to
the employees."''
In addition to statutory protections under the NLRA, employees may
have a right to refuse hazardous work based on the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement.'32 Additional rights may also be found in state and
local laws. Several states have statutory provisions that allow employees to
refuse hazardous work under varying standards and conditions. For
example, Ohio law provides public employees with a right to refuse to
work "under conditions that the public employee reasonably believes
present an imminent danger of death or serious harm to the public
employee, provided that such conditions are not such as normally exist for
or reasonably might be expected to occur in the occupation of the public
125. Id. (citation omitted in original).
126. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 607.
127. Id. See, e.g, Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 894 (1962), enforcement
denied on other grounds 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964); Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B.
140, 142 (1956), enforced 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 357 U.S. 927 (1958);
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 138 N.L.R.B. 737 (1962), enforced 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.
1964); Richmond Tank Car Co., 264 N.L.R.B. 174 (1982); Roadway Express, Inc., 217
N.L.R.B. 278 (1975).
128. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 607. See Beker Indus. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 975,
976-77 (1984); Mine Workers, District 6, 217 N.L.R.B. 541, 551 (1975); Union
Independiente de Empleados de Servicios, 249 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1980).
129. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 607
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See NLRB v. Md. Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 683 F.2d 109, 112 (4th Cir.
1982).
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employee."'' 3  Similarly, under Minnesota law, an employee "acting in
good faith has the right to refuse to work under conditions which the
employee reasonably believes present an imminent danger of death or
serious physical harm to the employee.' 34  Other states authorize an
employee to refuse to work in situations where an employer has failed to
provide information regarding hazardous substances at the worksite to the
employee in a timely manner, after the employee requested it.'35
The laws of the District of Columbia, which could conceivably have
aided Mr. Morris because he worked for USPS at Brentwood, which is
located in Washington, D.C., require employers to "furnish a place of
employment which shall be reasonably safe for employees .. .." 136
District of Columbia law also protects an employee against discrimination
because the employee refused to perform work that the employee believes
creates a dangerous situation that could cause harm to the physical health
or threatens the safety of the employee or another employee, for which the
employee is inadequately trained, or under conditions which are in
violation of the health and safety rules of the District or federal health and
safety or environmental laws.'37
B. The Right to Refuse Hazardous Work Under 29 C.F.R. §
1977.12(b)(2).
The OSH Act was designed to "assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions and to preserve our human resources ... .""' To achieve that
purpose, the OSH Act requires employers to "furnish to each of his
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees."' 3 9 However, the OSH Act does not
generally provide an employee with the right to "walk off the job because
of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace."'
40
An additional source of the right to refuse hazardous work, and the
one most applicable to Mr. Morris in October 2001, is found in 29 C.F.R.
1977.12, which provides an employee a limited right to refuse hazardous
133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4167.06 (2002).
134. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 182.654 (2001).
135. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 5-407 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5a-
16 (2002).
136. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-808 (2003).
137. D.C. CODEANN. § 32-1117 (2003).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
140. 29 C.F.R. 1977.12(b)(1). See also Tamara Foods, 692 F.2d at 1181.
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work under certain urgent circumstances. 41  Section (b)(2) of this rule
provides in part,
However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted
with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or
subjecting himself to serious injury or death arising from a
hazardous condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no
reasonable alternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself to
the dangerous condition, he would be protected against
subsequent discrimination. 42
Certain other conditions must be met for an employee to be protected
under this rule. First, the "condition causing the employee's apprehension
of death or injury must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under
the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that
there is a real danger of death or serious injury."'143 The employee must
also take such action, under the same reasonable person standard, because
of his or her belief "that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the
situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory
enforcement channels."' 44 Finally, the rule requires that the employee
"where possible, must have also sought from his employer, and been
unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition. 145
In Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,'46 the Supreme Court upheld 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) as a valid exercise of the Secretary of Labor's
rulemaking authority under the OSH Act. 47 In that case, two maintenance
employees refused their supervisor's order to climb out onto a wire mesh
fence that was hung, horizontally, over the plant production floor to prevent
objects from falling onto the workers below. 48 The employees refused to
do this after telling various supervisors about their concerns with climbing
onto the wire screen and after they asked one of their supervisors for the
name, telephone number, and address of a safety representative from the
local OSHA office. 4 9 Their concerns were largely prompted by the recent
death of a fellow employee who fell through the fence after climbing onto
it, and by prior instances in which employees had partially or completely
fallen through the wire screen.15 When the employees refused to follow
141. 29 C.F.R. 1977.12(b)(1), (2). See also Tamara Foods, 692 F.2d at 1181.
142. 29 C.F.R. 1977.12(b)(2).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
147. Id. at 22 (construing the extent of the Secretary of Labor's rulemaking authority
under 29 U.S.C.A. § 657(g)(2)).
148. Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. at 6-7.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 5-6. After the employee died, the employer established a policy that
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the order to work on the screen by stepping onto it, in violation of the
employer's own recently established policy to the contrary, they were
ordered to clock out for the remaining hours of their shift and were not paid
for that time.1
51
Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of Labor sued the employer in federal
district court for wrongfully discriminating against the two employees in
violation of the OSH Act.' The focus of the case was on the validity of 29
C.F.R. 1977.12(b)(2). The lower court, despite finding that the employees
were justified in refusing to perform the ordered work based on the text of
the regulation, denied relief because it held the regulation to be invalid
because it was not consistent with the OSH Act. 53 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals disagreed and reversed the district court's decision. 54  The
Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit Court's decision and held that the
regulation was a valid exercise of the Secretary of Labor's statutory
rulemaking powers under the OSH Act.'55
The Supreme Court upheld the regulation on two primary bases. First,
it held that the regulation was clearly consistent with the "fundamental
objective of the Act - to prevent occupational deaths and serious
injuries. '5 6  The Court carefully reviewed the legislative history of the
OSH Act, and noted that the history contained "numerous references to the
Act's preventive purpose and to the tragedy of each individual death or
accident."'' 57 The Court further stated,
[t]he Act does not wait for an employee to die or become injured.
It authorizes the promulgation of health and safety standards and
the issuance of citations in the hope that these will act to prevent
death or injuries from ever occurring. It would seem anomalous
maintenance personnel were not to climb onto the fence itself, but were to follow an
alternative procedure in replacing and repairing the wire screen. The employer was also
cited by OSHA for the incident in which the employee died.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id. (alleging that the employer violated the non-discrimination provisions of 29
U.S.C.A. § 660(c)(1)).
153. Id.
154. Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. at 8.
155. Id. at 8, 22.
156. Id. at 11.
157. Id. at 12, n.16. The Court cited to the statement of Senator Yarborough, a sponsor
of the Senate OSH bill, "We are talking about people's lives, not the indifference of some
cost accountants. We are talking about assuring the men and women who work in our
plants and factories that they will go home after a day's work with their bodies intact." Id.
(quoting Senator Yarborough's statements as recorded in 116 Cong. Rec. 37625 (1970),
Leg. Hist. 510.). See also Ries v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1164 (3d Cir.
1992) (commenting, "Indeed, the purpose of OSHA is preventive rather than
compensatory"); Mineral Indus. v. OSHRC, 639 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating,
"The goal of the Act is to prevent the first accident, not to serve as a source of consolation
for the first victim or his survivors").
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to construe an Act so directed and constructed as prohibiting an
employee, with no other reasonable alternative, the freedom to
withdraw from a workplace environment that he reasonably
believes is highly dangerous. 158
The Court also concluded that the regulation could be seen as a proper
tool to help fulfill the protections afforded employees by § 654(a)(1) of the
OSH Act. 159 The Court construed from the OSH Act's legislative history
that Congress intended the general duty clause to "deter the occurrence of
occupational deaths and serious injuries by placing on employers a
mandatory obligation independent of the specific health and safety
standards to be promulgated by the Secretary., 160 The Court further noted
that safety laws are to be "liberally construed to effectuate the
congressional purpose,"' 16' and also stated, "[s]ince OSHA inspectors
cannot be present around the clock in every workplace, the Secretary's
regulation ensures that employees will in all circumstances enjoy the rights
afforded them by the 'general duty' clause.' 62
In Marshall v. N.L. Industries, Inc. ,163 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a federal district court's ruling that the Secretary of Labor
could not sue an employer for discrimination against an employee who
refused allegedly hazardous work, where the employee had already won a
favorable decision at an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the governing
collective bargaining agreement.' 64 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall in
reversing the lower court's decision. 6 The Court of Appeals held that for
an employer to be liable for a violation of § 29 C.F.R. 1977.12(b)(2), the
Secretary of Labor must prove that an employee who refused work "had a
reasonable and good faith belief that the conditions leading to his
refusal ... were dangerous" and that the employer fired the employee, or
took other adverse action against him, because of the employee's refusal. 66
According to public guidance issued by OSHA, an employee who
refuses to perform an assigned task will be protected under this rule, if all
of the following conditions are met:
Where possible, you have asked the employer to eliminate the
danger, and the employer failed to do so; and [y]ou refused to
work in 'good faith.' This means that you must genuinely
158. Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. at 12.
159. Id. This provision is commonly referred to as the "general duty clause."
160. Id. at 13.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
164. Id. at 1225.
165. N.L. Industries, 618 F.2d at 1221. See also Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. 1, 22 (1980).
166. N.L. Industries, 618 F.2d at 1224.
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believe that an imminent danger exists. Your refusal cannot be a
disguised attempt to harass your employer or disrupt business;
and [a] reasonable person would agree that there is a real danger
of death or serious injury; and [t]here isn't enough time, due to
the urgency of the hazard, to get it corrected through regular
enforcement channels, such as requesting an OSHA inspection.
67
The guidance adds that where all of these conditions are met, an
employee should ask the employer to correct the hazard and to allow him to
do other work. 68 The employee should also tell the employer that he will
not do the work unless the hazard is corrected, and the employee should
stay at the work place until told to leave by the employer. 69 The guidance
concludes by advising an employee to contact OSHA immediately if his
employer discriminates against him for refusing to perform "dangerous
work." 7°
Factors that courts have strongly considered when applying the
reasonable person aspect of this rule include whether there have been prior
accidents as a result of the hazardous condition or prior instances where
equipment has malfunctioned, 7' whether the employee in question was
aware of such cases at the time he chose not to perform the assigned task,
72
the severity of the conditions at the time in question, 73 and whether the
employee complained to a supervisor about the dangers of the situation at
the time in question.174 Employers have countered with the argument that a
particular employee did not act reasonably because others continued to do
the same work after the employee refused to do so, but courts have
generally not found this type of evidence to be persuasive regarding the
reasonableness of an employee's refusal to perform hazardous work, in part
because the continued work by different employees under the same
circumstances may have been unreasonable itself. 75 A singular exception
167. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, Refusing to Work Because
Conditions are Dangerous, available at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa.worker/refuse.html
(Mar. 29, 2003).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Dole v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 573, 578 (W.D.N.Y.
1990); Donovan v. Hahner, Foreman & Harness, Inc., 736 F.2d 1421, 1428 (10th Cir. 1984).
172. See Dole, 752 F. Supp. at 578; Donovan, 736 F.2d at 1428; Stepp v. Review Bd. of
the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 521 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Court of Appeals of Indiana, 4th
Cir. 1988).
173. See, e.g., Donovan, 736 F.2d at 1428; Stepp, 521 N.E.2d at 354.
174. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 1980 WL 29272 (C.D. 111. 1980).
175. Compare Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 1980 WL 29272 (C.D.I1I. 1980), and In re
Hahner, Foreman & Harness, Inc, 1982 WL 119252 (D. Kan. Dec. 3, 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d
1421 (10th Cir. 1984), with Nat'l Indus. Constructors, Inc., 1980 WL 29273 (D. Neb. Jan.
25, 1980), and Dole, 752 F. Supp. at 578.
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is found in the case of Marshall v. National Industrial Constructors, Inc.,
176
in which the federal district court relied in part on evidence that work
which three employees had refused to do was subsequently performed
without incident by different employees. 77 The fact that employers have
not generally succeeded with this type of post-hoc argument verifies the
precise manner in which the rule has been applied, based upon its language
that requires the application of a test which objectively compares the
actions of the employee against those of a "reasonable person, under the
circumstances then confronting the employee... ,,78
While the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall'79 stated that
the OSH Act "does not wait for an employee to die or become injured" in
order for an employee to be protected by its provisions, some courts have
been more skeptical of an employee's claimed good faith belief about a
hazardous condition where evidence of prior accidents was not presented or
was not known to the employee at the time he refused to work."8 Courts
have also refused to uphold an employee's refusal to perform assigned
work, however, where there is evidence that the employee was not
motivated by safety concerns, but rather by some other motive-like trying
to obtain more money by refusing to perform an assigned task. s18  The
employer's attitude and responsiveness in the face of an employee's safety-
related complaints or refusal to perform an allegedly hazardous task have
also carried great weight in past cases.
The protections afforded an employee under § 1977.12(b)(2) are more
similar in scope to those provided under § 502 of the LMRA, because an
objective analysis is required to evaluate the employee's work refusal,
versus a merely subjective, good faith analysis under § 7 of the NLRA
regarding protected, concerted activity.' 2  Even in the case of an
employee's invocation of a protection from a collective bargaining
agreement under § 7, the reasonableness inquiry will focus on the facts in
relation to the terms of the bargaining agreement, and will not require a
court to apply an objective, reasonable person analysis to the employee's
decision based on the conditions the employee was faced with at the
176. 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
177. Id.
178. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2).
179. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
180. Id. at 12. See also Stepp, 521 N.E.2d at 354; Nat'l Indus. Constructors, 1980 WL
29273 (D. Neb. Jan. 25, 1980).
181. See Nat'l Indus. Constructors, 1980 WL 29273 (commenting in dictum that a work
refusal was motivated by money and not by hazardous conditions); Stepp, 521 N.E.2d at 354
(stating in dictum that it was reasonable to conclude that lab employee's refusal to handle
AIDS labeled vials was based on religious beliefs and not safety concerns).
182. See Backer, supra note 102.
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time.'8 3  The regulation will potentially protect a greater number of
employees than will § 7 because the requirement of concerted activity does
not apply and because it covers employees as defined by the OSH Act, the
number of which exceeds that of employees covered under the National
Labor Relations Act.' 4  However, in reality, the protections of the
regulation may be more limited because of the application of a reasonable
person test which does not apply in a § 7 analysis.'85
To be protected under 29 C.F.R. § 1977(b)(2) when refusing to
perform hazardous work, an employee must have a subjective, good faith
belief regarding the dangerousness of the situation and regarding the lack
of other options besides refusing the assigned work. 86 Additionally, the
employee's refusal must be objectively reasonable, based on a reasonable
person standard. 18  This standard may not be difficult to meet in cases
dealing with hazards that are fairly common in the workplace or that can be
easily detected through observation, such as cases of malfunctioning
equipment or of hazardous conditions caused by adverse weather
conditions on a particular occasion.! But it is also a standard that at best
will be difficult to apply, and at worst, impossible to apply fairly when
dealing with terrorist acts or threats in the workplace, as the case of Mr.
Morris illustrates.
C. What Would a Reasonable Person at Brentwood Have Done?
Mr. Morris could not have refused to work under hazardous
conditions, as a form of concerted, protected activity, under either § 7 of
the NLRA or § 502 of the LMRA. As a member of the APWU, Mr. Morris
was subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement which
provided that the APWU and its members would not "call or sanction a
strike or slowdown." 89 While the collective bargaining agreement required
USPS management officials "to provide safe working conditions in all
present and future installations and to develop a safe working force," it did
not authorize employees or their union to refuse work because of hazardous
or unsafe working conditions.1 90
More importantly, Mr. Morris was barred from striking by federal law
183. See City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 837, 840.
184. See Backer, supra note 102, at 560-564.
185. See id. at 564.
186. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2).
187. Id.
188. See generally Backer, supra note 102, at 576-77.
189. Collective Bargaining Agreement, USPS and APWU, 1998-2000, available at
http://www.apwu.org.
190. Id.
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under the same terms as other federal employees.' 9' If he engaged in a
strike he was subject to criminal penalties, including a fine and possible
imprisonment of up to one year. 92 The prohibition against participation in
a strike by federal employees includes postal employees, and it has
survived constitutionally based challenges. 93 This barrier also precluded
him from the protections of § 502 of the LMRA, which excludes from the
word "strike" an employee's refusal to work when faced with "abnormally
dangerous conditions.' 94  While postal employees are subject to the
provisions of the NLRA, 95 they are not protected by the provisions of the
LMRA. 1
96
In 1988, the Postal Employees Safety Enhancement Act made the
OSH Act applicable to the USPS "in the same manner as any other
employer."'97  This statute achieves that goal by including the postal
service within the definition of the term "employer" under the OSH Act,
while excluding the "United States or any State or political subdivision of a
State" as a covered employer. 19' As a result, Mr. Morris was an employee
191. See Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, P.L. 91-375 (codified at 39 U.S.C.A. §
410). "Labor-management relations would, in general, be subject to the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and its provisions would be enforceable by the National Labor
Relations Board and the Federal Courts. Unfair labor practice charges would be handled
just as they are in the private sector ... [T]he postal service is too important to the people
and the economy of this nation for us to tolerate postal strikes. Under H.R. 17070, the
existing ban on strikes by federal employees would be continued without change." (citing
Postal Reorganization Act House Report No. 91-1104, May 19, 1970, 2 U.S. Code Cong.
and Admin. News 1970, p. 3662).
192. See 39 U.S.C. § 410(b)(2) (incorporating the provisions of title 18 regarding
employees of the United States Government); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1918(3); 5 U.S.C. §
7311(3).
193. See, e.g., United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); United States v. Taylor, 693 F.2d 919, 921-22 (9th Cir.
1982).
194. 29 U.S.C.A. § 143 (2003).
195. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (2003).
196. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-144 (2003). See 39 U.S.C.A. § 1209(a). See also Manriquez v.
U.S. Postal Service, M.S.P.B. 1985, 29 M.S.P.R. 540, 542 (stating that "The Federal labor
laws are not applicable to the Postal Service absent a specific provision in the Postal
Reorganization Act (PRA) or other statute."); see also McCandless v. U.S. Postal Service,
62 M.S.P.R. 383 (1994) (commenting, "Under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970,
Pub.L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
(1970))(PRA), the Postal Service is the only Federal entity subject to the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). # 39 U.S.C. § 1202.").
197. Postal Employees Safety Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-241 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. § 7902 (1998), 29 U.S.C.A. § 652(5) (1998), and 29 U.S.C.A. §
668(a) (2003)).
198. Id. Other employees of the United States are covered by the provisions of 29
U.S.C.A. § 668, regarding safety programs for Federal agencies, and are beyond the scope
of this paper. Employees of Federal agencies also have a right to decline to perform an
assigned task "because of a reasonable belief that, under the circumstances the task poses an
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under the OSH Act and was covered by the provisions of 29 C.F.R. §
1977.12(b)(2).' 99
Aside from any potential relief that Mr. Morris might have gained
pursuant to the laws of the District of Columbia, 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2)
was the only potentially meaningful source of protection for Mr. Morris to
rely upon if he had chosen to walk off the job or otherwise refused to work,
without the fear of losing his job or otherwise being disciplined, during the
anthrax crisis of 2001. To that end, the critical question is what would a
reasonable person have done when faced with the same circumstances as
Mr. Morris at the time it was happening?
Mr. Morris suspected that he had been infected with anthrax, as
evidenced in his 911 call, and clearly, must have been aware of the growing
anthrax crisis prior to Friday, October 12, the first day that he could have
been exposed to the apparently undetectable spores at Brentwood. 00 Postal
officials were aggressively trying to communicate with postal employees
through numerous press releases and mandatory bulletins to be briefed to
postal employees through various means, throughout the month of October.
Would Mr. Morris' job have been protected if he had refused to come to
work, prior to October 12, based on the provisions of 29 C.F.R. §
1977.12(b)(2)?
Assuming that a reasonable person received the numerous bulletins
and other information provided by USPS officials (in addition to
information available from numerous media sources) during the earliest
stages of the anthrax crisis, he would have known that postal investigators
were helping with the investigation of the Florida cases, that anthrax had
been found in The Sun's offices, where one worker had died of inhalational
anthrax, and another, who handled mail, was sick with inhalational
anthrax.20' He also would have known that his employer was sending out a
barrage of messages relating to anthrax and the mail, which described in
part various procedures to follow in order to be safe, and also repeatedly
assured postal employees that there was no known link between anthrax
202and the mail. In light of this information, it is clear that a reasonableperson could not have justifiably refused to go to work at Brentwood on
imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm coupled with a reasonable belief that there is
insufficient time to seek effective redress through normal hazard reporting and abatement
procedures .... 29 C.F.R. § 1960.46. See also Brian Friel, Facing Anthrax Threat,
Employees Have Limited Right Not to Work, GoVEXEC.COM, Oct. 30, 2001, available at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1001/102901b.htm.
199. See Postal Employees Safety Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-241
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 652(6) (1998) and 29 U.S.C.A. § 668(a) (1998)).
200. Associated Press, supra note 1.
201. See Ballard, supra note 32.
202. See USPSNEwSTALK, SPECIAL EDITION, supra note 47; USPSNEwsBREAK A.M.,
supra note 47.
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Friday, October 12, even if he had a subjective, good faith belief that going
to work would be likely to cause him death or serious bodily injury because
of potential anthrax exposure. By all accounts, Mr. Morris took the
approach of a reasonable person, and was exposed to anthrax at some point
between October 12 and October 16.203
In his 911 call, Mr. Morris said that on Saturday, October 13, he was
in the vicinity of an envelope with powder in it which a coworker handled,
and that this incident was reported to a supervisor, although he was never
told, at least perhaps officially, whether or not it was positive for anthrax. 2°
Could he have justifiably refused to stay at Brentwood after he was
exposed to this envelope? Using the reasonable person standard of §
1977.12(b)(2), the answer is unclear. While postal officials apparently
gave the envelope in question to FBI officials for testing, it does not appear
that they complied with their own anthrax policy that was in effect at the
time because there is no indication that they isolated and evacuated the area
until law enforcement officials arrived, or that they even notified any other
emergency response officials, which their own policy required. 2°' They did
not perform any environmental testing at Brentwood until Thursday,
October 18, and by all accounts the environmental testing was primarily
done in response to the events on Capitol Hill, as opposed to the reported
envelope with powder from Saturday the 13th.2°6 Postal officials also did
not have Mr. Morris or his coworkers who handled or were near this
envelope tested for anthrax infection or given antibiotics as a prophylactic
measure.207 Their inaction was presumably due to the failed advice of
officials from the CDC, whose approach throughout the ordeal seemed to
be, at least in part, to wait to react until sufficient evidence arose - in the
201form of a sick employee.
The presence of an envelope with powder in it, amidst all that was
occurring at the time, provides a stronger basis for a reasonable person to
have concluded that it was no longer safe to come to work, or to stay at
work during that shift, at Brentwood on the 13th. At the same time, the
message from USPS' officials that all was okay had been repeatedly
203. See generally CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 70, at 1129-33; and Jernigan,
supra note 13, at 933, 937.
204. Associated Press, supra note 1.
205. See Rosenbaum, supra note 94 (reporting that the suspect letter was set aside and
given to the FBI). See also United States Postal Service Management Instruction, supra
note 17 (stating that it is management's responsibility to minimize potential exposures
through quick isolation and evacuation until emergency response and law enforcement can
arrive and take control of the incident).
206. See Potter Statement, supra note 6.
207. Id.
208. See Terhune, supra note 25 (quoting Dr. Perkins of the CDC); see also House
Oversight Hearings, supra note 6.
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heralded against a backdrop that no one at Brentwood was then known to
be sick; this would have been formidable evidence for a reasonable person
to have ignored under the circumstances. 209 At best, a reasonable person
like Mr. Morris, would have been presented with a nearly impossible
choice. At worst, he would have been fired or disciplined had he chosen to
walk off the job, unless later vindicated.
Would the picture have changed on Monday, October 15, when the
letter to Senator Daschle was discovered and first publicized? The answer
is probably so, at least for Mr. Morris and any other employees who knew
of the envelope with powder in it from Saturday, October 13. While that
letter turned out to be negative for anthrax, USPS officials did not publicly
announce that fact until November 7, the day that the text of Mr. Morris'
911 call was being publicized for the first time.21 ° In that press release,
postal officials said that employees at Brentwood were told of the negative
test results, but they did not say when they were told nor did they say that
Mr. Morris was ever told."' Not until the next day, November 8, did postal
officials assert that Mr. Morris was told of the negative test results prior to
his death.21 2 Mr. Morris' statements in his 911 call seem to refute that
assertion, and reflect his frustration at not being able to get enough
information and not trusting those who gave it to him.2 " Regardless, once
Mr. Morris knew, presumably on Monday evening, October 15, or
Tuesday, October 16, that the letter to Senator Daschle had come through
Brentwood, he would have possessed a stronger basis to refuse to go to
work at Brentwood, under 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2), because a reasonable
person in his shoes likely would have done the same thing. At the same
time the issue is close because throughout that week USPS officials
continued to send reassuring messages based on the advice of the CDC that
Brentwood employees were not at risk, which culminated in a press
conference at Brentwood on Thursday, October, 18, the day that USPS
officials finally began environmental testing. 14 The choice of whether or
not to go into work at Brentwood would have been extremely difficult for a
reasonable person to make under those circumstances.
The same would have been true for Mr. Morris. There is no
information in the public domain that indicates that Mr. Morris missed any
scheduled work shifts during the week of October 15 because he refused to
go to work out of fear for his health." 5 Further, if he had refused to go to
209. See USPSNEwSTALK, supra note 47; USPSNEwsBREAK A.M., supra note 47.
210. See UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE NEWS, supra note 90.
211. Id.
212. See USPSNEwSBREAK A.M., supra note 91.
213. See Associated Press, supra note 1.
214. See Potter Statement, supra note 6.
215. The author asked on several occasions for information about this issue and other
issues of Mr. Jimmy Bell, Esquire, attorney for Mr. Morris' estate in the pending wrongful
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work, perhaps on Tuesday or Wednesday of that week, it may not have
made a significant difference for several reasons: he almost certainly had
already been infected by that time; his healthcare provider apparently
misdiagnosed him on Thursday the 18th because no testing began at
Brentwood until Thursday of that week; and no antibiotics were given to
employees as a precaution until after Mr. Morris died on the following
216Sunday. Then again, if he had taken a stand and refused to go to work
because of the fears that he certainly experienced, perhaps he would have
drawn attention to himself and his suspicions and perhaps he would have
gotten a response from USPS officials despite the mistaken advice they
were getting from the CDC at the time.217
Mr. Morris was not able to enjoy any measurable protections under 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2), at the time when his rights under the rule were
most needed. If he had walked off the job, or at least refused to continue
working in Brentwood in order to protect himself before the time that he
was almost certainly exposed, the 12th or 13th of October, he would have
failed the reasonable person test contained in the rule and placed his job in
jeopardy. He would have had a stronger basis to walk off the job after
seeing an envelope with powder in it on Saturday, October 13, but whether
he could have refused work is a very close issue and would have certainly
presented an impossible choice for him to make, particularly if a supervisor
told him at the time or soon thereafter that he must come back to work or
be subject to disciplinary action. Once he knew that the letter to Senator
Daschle had come through Brentwood, when coupled with his encounter
with the envelope with powder from Saturday, October 13, he probably
could have justifiably refused to report to work, at least at Brentwood or in
the part of Brentwood that he thought might be contaminated with anthrax.
At the same time, the decision would have been extremely difficult for him
to make under the circumstances because his employer was assuring postal
employees throughout the week of October 15 that there was no known risk
to Brentwood employees based on the advice of CDC officials.
The protections of § 1977.12(b)(2) were hollow and failed Mr. Morris
in this case. Any protections from the rule would have be applicable to him
only when it was too late to provide him with any meaningful chance of
avoiding infection from anthrax, which is the purpose behind the rule. The
death suit against his healthcare provider, but Mr. Bell never responded to the requests
(email requests on file with the author).
216. See Jernigan, supra note 13, at 933, 937; see also Associated Press, supra note 1;
Estate of Thomas L. Morris, Jr., supra note 84; Potter Statement, supra note 6.
217. See UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, United States Postal Service Fact Sheet, Mid-
day Update (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.apwu.org/departments/ir/s&h/
anthrax/USPS%20Fact%20Sheets/USPS%2OFact%2OSheet%200ct.%2025,%202001%20M
id-Day.PDF (stating, "Employees who did not report to work as scheduled [at Brentwood]
are being contacted to ensure they are in good health.")
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language of the rule and the cases wherein employees were held to be
justified in relying in refusing hazardous work indicate that it was designed
to protect employees against hazards or dangers that are identifiable, based
upon the requirement to test an employee's refusal against a reasonable
person standard "under the circumstances then facing the employee.,,21 " An
employee's generalized suspicion or hunch was not meant to be protected
by the rule, which is understandable when dealing with workplace hazards
that are common to the workplace or at least easily identifiable, such as• . 219
faulty machinery, bad weather conditions, inadequate equipment, etc.
The current rule, however, is clearly inadequate to protect employees
in any meaningful, preventive way against many hazards that will come as
a result of terrorist activity in the workplace. As the anthrax case
illustrates, many such hazards, at least those associated with the use of
biological or chemical agents as a weapon of terror, may be invisible and
odorless and largely impossible to detect until it is too late. The anthrax
crisis, if nothing else was a case in which the sophistication level of the
threat at hand-the threat of anthrax spores infecting mail handlers during
mail processing, outpaced the scientific knowledge of our best experts who
were working on the case. Mr. Morris needed more protections than §
1977.12(b)(2) offered in this case, in light of the failures of his employer
and CDC officials to protect him, and America's workers need greater
protections as well to better equip them to face the harm and the fear that
future terrorist acts will certainly bring.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO BETTER PROTECT EMPLOYEES
The tragic death of Mr. Morris from anthrax inhalation illustrates the
vulnerability of America's workers to terrorist activity at work. The
numerous warnings by government officials since that crisis regarding the
threat of future terrorist activity in America also make clear that America's
workers will be targets or at least have to face the indirect consequences of
such acts in the future.
220
The inability of Mr. Morris' employer to protect him against a weapon
of bioterrorism at work is stunning in light of the fact USPS officials were
working so closely with officials from the CDC and other experts at the
time. Few employers would have more resources or access to better advice
than the USPS had during the anthrax crisis of 2001. Unfortunately, its
resources and the CDC's advice were not enough to prevent Mr. Morris'
death. The CDC was wrong in its assumptions until it was too late
218. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2).
219. See generally TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 61, at 6, 7.
220. See generally, The Department of Homeland Security,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/.
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regarding the threat that the letter to Senator Daschle posed to postal
employees at Brentwood, and the fact that the powder laced letter of
October 13, 2001 did not raise more suspicions before Mr. Morris died is
troubling indeed. Despite the potential to spread blame, it is clear that this
was largely a case in which the sophistication level of the threat at issue
outpaced the scientific and medical knowledge available to prevent it.
Similar situations will almost certainly occur in the future in relation to
other types of terrorist acts, and to conclude that we have seen it all in
terms of the potential means by which terrorist activity will be perpetrated
on American soil and in America's workplaces would be foolish indeed.
Consequently, steps should be taken to better protect America's
workers against the threat of terrorist activity in the workplace. One such
change is to allow workers the opportunity to protect themselves better,
under reasonably limited circumstances, by increasing their right to refuse
hazardous work in the face of the threat of a terrorist attack in the
workplace. To that end, the Secretary of Labor should promulgate a
regulation to supplement the terms of 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2). The
proposed regulation should provide as follows:
No employee shall be discriminated against for refusing to
perform an assigned task or for refusing to expose himself to a
hazardous condition or situation resulting from a terrorist act or
the threat thereof, under the following conditions:
(1) where the employee honestly believes, under the
circumstances, that the task, condition, or situation will result in
death or serious injury, and (2) where the employee honestly
believes that the danger cannot be adequately alleviated by resort
to regular statutory enforcement channels under the OSH Act, or
through adherence to his or her employer's emergency action
plan or emergency response procedures, so long as the
employee's honest belief regarding each issue is supported by
some ascertainable, objective evidence that was known to the
employee at the time.
While this regulation would not serve as the ultimate solution to protect
America's workers against terrorist activity, it would be an important tool
to protect them better in certain situations where they otherwise may not be
protected.
The proposed regulation would reasonably enhance the right of
employees to refuse hazardous work without having to be judged against
the reasonable person standard of § 1977.12(b)(2), which will not
adequately protect employees when faced with life or death choices that
terrorist activity will present while on the job. The reasonable person
standard of the current regulation will be ineffective in such cases,
particularly those featuring threats in which the sophistication level of the
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threat exceeds the bounds of science known at the time, because the
employee will not be able to know, with any modicum of assurance, what a
reasonable person would do under the same circumstances.
The reasonable person standard will also fall short during subsequent
litigation, if the rule is applied as it is written, without the benefit of
hindsight, which would prove so crucial in evaluating Mr. Morris' rights to
refuse hazardous work. Looking back, many people would agree that Mr.
Morris should have stayed away from Brentwood beginning October 13,
when he saw an envelope with powder in it, if not the day before, during
the midst of the growing anthrax crisis. However, in deciding what a
reasonable person would have done at the time and under the same
circumstances that he was facing, it is clear that the standard offered no
meaningful protections to him when it was crucial because the advice his
employer was giving him was wrong, based on the failed advice of the
CDC. It is reasonable to anticipate that other employees will find
themselves in similar predicaments in the future when faced with terrorist
activity or the threats thereof at work. To rely on the hope that authorities
would deviate from the language of the rule and apply it in a lenient
fashion when reviewing cases in the future is not reasonable and provides
no benefit to employees who will need to look to its provisions when
making these vital choices.
In Refusals of Hazardous Work Assignments: A Proposal for a
Uniform Standard,22" ' the author reviewed the different sources of the rights
to refuse hazardous work under the federal labor laws and under 29 C.F.R.
§ 1977.12(b)(2), and concluded that a uniform, federal standard should be
12adopted based on the federal regulation. The author argued that the
adoption of a uniform standard would eliminate the problem of uncertainty
that surrounds the right because its scope varies depending on the source on
which it is based.22' He further argued that a uniform reasonable person
standard would promote government efficiency, reduce the incentive for
forum shopping during litigation, and generally promote the overall
congressional objective of uniformity in relation to federal labor laws.24
While these arguments hold true today regarding the right of an employee
to refuse hazardous work, the standard called for by the author is not the
appropriate solution for the vexing problem that terrorist activity in the
workplace presents.
The proposed standard would promote the interests that the author
previously identified while also giving employees a more meaningful right
on which they could depend, if needed, to protect themselves without the
221. See Backer, supra note 102.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 568-77.
224. Id. at 572-75.
20031
582 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 5:3
fear of risking their jobs. As opposed to the extremely broad protections
afforded employees engaged in concerted activity under § 7 of the NLRA,
the proposed standard would be more limited and thus more balanced in
protecting the interests of employers against potential abuses by employees
who might choose to walk off the job or refuse a specified task for nearly
225any conceivable reason. Furthermore, the proposed standard would
avoid the pitfall found in the high standard required to invoke the
protections afforded by § 502 of the LMRA, which would prove
particularly troubling in a situation like the one that Mr. Morris
experienced at Brentwood.226
Specifically, to justify an employee's refusal to work under § 502, the
NLRB General Counsel must show in part, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the employee's belief ("supported by ascertainable, objective
evidence") was a good faith belief that the working conditions were
abnormally dangerous, and that "the perceived danger posed an immediate
threat of harm to employee health or safety. 227 While the NLRB indicated
in a footnote of its TNS, Inc. decision that it "reject[ed] the position of the
amici that Section 502 applies only when the General Counsel has proved
that working conditions were in fact abnormally dangerous,, 228 it is clear
from the Board's own test that there must be a preponderance of the
evidence that the "perceived danger posed an immediate threat of harm to
employee health or safety." Despite this apparent contradiction, a
reasonable interpretation of the Board's view on this issue is that an
employer will not be able to prevail automatically on a § 502 related issue
by merely showing that the conditions were "'safe-in-fact,"' particularly
when based upon after the fact evidence (the Board indicated, however,
that it would generally find this type of evidence helpful). 229 However, the
inability of an employer to prevail automatically through this type of
defense does not remove the General Counsel's burden of showing,
through ascertainable, objective evidence, that the "perceived danger posed
225. "The subjective standard of section 7 is weighted too heavily on the employee's
side, resulting in too much deference to employee action in questionable situations."
Backer, supra note 102, at 576.
226. See generally TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602 (establishing the test for a protected
work stoppage under Section 502 of the NLMRA). "Section 502 weighs the interests of the
employer too heavily, making it almost impossible for an employee to prevail, resulting in
an imbalance in which employees must risk death or injury in situations where the employer
could relatively easily correct the condition." Backer, supra note 102, at 576.
227. TSN, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 606.
228. Id. at n.7.
229. Id.; Banyard, 505 F.2d at 348 n.38 (commenting that evidence that the allegedly
unsafe truck was driven for 800 miles without incident or repairs after the employee refused
to drive it was "irrelevant to whether there was 'ascertainable, objective evidence'
supporting a justified conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work existed at
the time he refused to drive.")
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an immediate threat of harm to employee health or safety." 230 What is
unclear is the weight that the Board would give to "'safe-in-fact"' evidence
that an employer might present in weighing the sufficiency of the General
Counsel's evidence regarding the reality of a danger that met the required,
objective threshold.23'
Finally, the proposed standard would make the right to refuse
hazardous work an individual one, as opposed to one that is contingent on
the presence of concerted activity. This seems more appropriate because
the decision to protect oneself in this type of situation would most properly
be a personal one that should not be contingent on decisions or actions of
one's coworkers.232 The proposed standard would also provide employers
with an incentive to use emergency action plans increasingly to help
prepare for terrorist related activity, along with other workplace
emergencies, before such events occur, by essentially requiring employees
to look to such plans first before refusing to work. While such plans cannot
address every conceivable emergency scenario, limiting an employee's
right to refuse hazardous work because of terrorist activity to cases in
which the employee honestly believes, based on some objective evidence,
that the employer's emergency action plan or procedures will not protect
him, will cause employers and employees to want to work together in
advance to plan for emergency situations with an increased spirit of
cooperation. Finally, the potential for abuse by employees should be
minimized by the requirement that employees will not be able to refuse
hazardous work because of terrorist related activity unless they can point to
some objective, ascertainable evidence to support their fears for their
safety. In Mr. Morris' case, his encounter with the envelope containing a
powdery substance on October 13, 2001, would have been the objective,
ascertainable evidence required under the proposed standard to justify his
refusal to work at Brentwood thereafter.233 While the proposed standard
might not have altered Mr. Morris' fate, it might have allowed him to call
greater attention to his fears about his safety by more readily providing him
the option of refusing to work at Brentwood shortly after he was apparently
234exposed to anthrax spores. The proposed standard should also help
protect other employees in the future by giving them an additional option to
protect themselves, when all else has apparently failed.
The author of Refusals of Hazardous Work Assignments: A Proposal
for a Uniform Standard also proposed that § 1977.12(b)(2)'s provisions
become the uniform, federal standard, through the use of memorandums of
230. Id.
231. See TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 608 n.31.
232. See id. at 577.
233. See generally Associated Press, supra note 1.
234. See United States Postal Service Fact Sheet, supra note 217.
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understanding between the NLRB and OSHA. 35 Such a step would not be
adequate for the current proposal because it would not sufficiently provide
employees with notice regarding their rights in terrorist-related situations,
but instead would add to the confusion that the current, varied standards
236most certainly promote. The better approach would be for Congress to
modify the NLRA and the LMRA, to make the proposed standard a
uniform, federal standard for employees under § 1977.12, and for those
subject to the NLRA, regardless of whether or not they are represented by a
bargaining representative.
V. CONCLUSION
The death of Mr. Thomas Morris, Jr. from inhalational anthrax while
at work reaffirmed, after the tragic events of September 11, that America's
workers are vulnerable to terrorist activity at the workplace. Despite the
vast resources at the disposal of his employer, USPS, and the direct access
that postal officials had to the best experts available, he was not adequately
protected, primarily because the sophistication level of the threat outpaced
the knowledge of our best experts at the time. Mr. Morris' preventive
rights against the threat of terrorist activity were also deficient because he
could not have enjoyed a reasonable right to help himself by walking off
the job at Brentwood until it was most likely too late. This problem can be
addressed by reasonably increasing the rights of America's employees to
refuse hazardous work in the face of terrorist attacks in the workplace.
While increasing this right, as proposed in this article, will not prove to
absolutely protect workers from the threat of such attacks in the workplace,
it will serve as one step along the path towards increasing their protections
against future threats from anthrax and other weapons of terrorism. And
importantly, it will help to alleviate the fears caused by such threats-the
type of fear that Mr. Morris tragically had to endure in his final moments of
life because of his encounter with anthrax spores in the workplace.
235. Backer, supra note 102, at 578.
236. See id. at 569 (discussing problems of current multi-standard system).
